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Abstract 
This paper extensively employs the order and trade data to analyze the shape of limit 
order book and the behavior of strategic order submission.  The order book of stocks 
exhibits weakly convex pattern on the bid side due to wide price spreads away from 
the market.  This characteristic of liquidity is particularly strong for the small stocks 
with large minimum tick size.  In addition, the same order type occurs more 
frequently after the event had occurred than it would unconditionally.  This diagonal 
effect is not fully explained by the order splitting.  Moreover, the determinants driving 
order aggressiveness include bid-ask spread, market depths, other price spreads and 
depths away from the market, and market sentiment.  Responding to the limit order 
book movement, an order aggressiveness revision behavior of market order traders is 
opposite to limit order traders, and contrarian traders react stronger than momentum 
traders.   
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Analysis of Limit Order Book and Order Flow 
 
1 Introduction 
A limit order book represents the remaining orders standing at various price 
limits after netting for the execution and cancellation.  Many exchanges around the 
world have operated under the pure limit order driven system including Euronext, 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, HongKong Stock Exchange, Australian Stock Exchange, for 
instance.  The NYSE recently has begun to disclose the real-time specialist’s order 
book and all liquidity quote information through the membership subscription since 
June 13, 2003.  Bondarenko and Sung (2003) developed the model showing the 
impacts of NYSE’s move to reveal the real-time specialist’s order book.  The 
transparency of specialist’s order book could result in a reduction in the specialist’s 
participation and profits, a reduction in the bid-ask spreads, an increase in trading 
volume, and a reduction in the price volatility.  These suggest that the order book 
information beyond the best quote would affect the price discovery process and the 
behavior of traders.   
The shares standing on the order book may not necessarily be distributed 
uniformly.  In the presence of informed trading, liquidity providers are concerned 
about the picked off risk, so the depths of the order book would be thin at the market 
compared with other depths away from the market.  Moreover, a tick size rule could 
affect the shape of order book.  The small tick size might not be enough compensation 
for the cost of liquidity provision.  As a result, the order book is relatively thin at the 
market.  Interestingly, past literature on the pure order driven market do not report the 
same shape of order book.  Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) found that the order book 
on the Paris Bourse is weakly concave, while Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) showed 
that the order book on the Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) is convex.  Al-Suhaibani 
and Kryzanowski (2000) reported that the order book of Saudi Stock Exchange (SSM) 
did not significantly deviate from linearity.  The concavity and the convexity of order 
book refer to the degree of the curvature of the graph, which plots the depth at each 
quote in the order book on the x-axis against the distance of price limit from the quote 
midpoint on the y-axis.  The convexity is associated with the availability of liquidity 
and the small price spreads at the market compared to further away from the market.  
So far the determinants of the shape of limit order book are not yet fully understood.   
Hence, this study exploits the order and trade data on the Stock Exchange of 
Thailand (SET) to recreate the limit order book and analyze its shape.  The findings 
show that the cross-sectional order book of the SET is weakly convex on the bid side 
of order book while the ask side is uniformly distributed.  Further investigation on the 
determinants of the shape of order book reveals that a difference between the 
curvature of order book between the Paris Bourse and the SET could arise from the 
higher minimum relative spread, and the higher asymmetric information on the SET.  
On average, the tick size on the SET is larger than those in the Paris Bourse, SSE and 
SSM.  Moreover, the order books of small and high price volatility firms are more 
concave compared to large and low price volatility firms.  
Biais et al (1995) report that the order sequences do not arrive at random, but 
instead the most likely incoming order type would be the same order type that just 
arrived.  This phenomenon is named as the diagonal effect, which may be a result of 
an order splitting, a trading imitation, and a same response to the information.  The 
diagonal effect is prevalent on the SET.  We computed the time interval between 
orders and it showed that the order splitting should not be the sole reason of the 
diagonal effect.     
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Parlour (1998) used the one-tick dynamic model in which the placement 
decision of trader is influenced from the past order, and the probability of execution 
and the cost of execution are endogeneous to show that the order flow patterns could 
exist even in absence of asymmetric information.  Ranaldo (2003) has reported that 
not all of his findings are consistent with the Parlour (1998)’s predictions.  For 
example, Parlour (1998)’s model predicted that the probability of successive limit buy 
order, Pr[LBt|LBt-1], should be less than the probability of limit sell order followed by 
limit buy order, Pr[LBt|LSt].  Intuitively, after the limit sell order arrival, there is no 
change in the length of the queue on the bid, while after the limit buy order arrival, 
the length of the queue on the bid is longer.  Consequently, as execution probability 
falls, so a limit buy order arrival is less likely to follow the limit buy order compared 
to follow the limit sell order.  Interestingly, Ranaldo (2003) find the opposite results 
on the Swiss Stock Exchange (SWX).  
The study shows that the order sequences on the SET are different from the 
predictions of Parlour (1998)’s model which does not take into account the effect of 
asymmetric information.  During the period of study, the asymmetric information on 
the SET is high because Thailand underwent the 1997 currency crisis, where many 
financial institutions were shut down.  High adverse selection cost affects the 
placement strategy.  The SET has a different order flow patterns from the findings of 
Ranaldo (2003) on the SWX, which was in the bullish market.  This might indicate 
the effect of market sentiment to the order flow pattern. 
Therefore, we further conducted an analysis on the association of the state of 
limit order book, market sentiment, and the order aggressiveness.  In the related work, 
Griffiths et al (2000) and Ranaldo (2003), they focused on the impact of bid-ask 
spread and market depth on the order aggressiveness decision.  This study however 
aims to show that, not only the best quote, the price spread and depth away from the 
market also influence the placement strategy of trader.  We found that the same 
spread, the relative price spread between price at the best quote and the price at the 
third quote, are positively associated with the order aggressiveness because trader 
pays a small cost to move up the queue in the limit order book.  Order aggressiveness 
is positively associated with the same depth away from the market, which is 
consistent to the crowding out effect that the liquidity providers compete against each 
other to increase their execution probability.  Moreover, limit order traders and market 
order traders oppositely response to the change in the state of limit order book.  When 
the bid-ask spread is wider, limit order traders have the higher likelihood to submit 
the more aggressive order because of the higher compensation, while market order 
traders are likely to submit less aggressive order due to the higher execution cost.   
Furthermore, the study compared the behavior of buyers and sellers under the 
bullish and bearish period.  We showed that the buyers (sellers) in the bearish 
(bullish) market response to the change of state of limit order book stronger than the 
buyers (sellers) in the bullish (bearish) market.  Moreover, the buyers in the bullish 
market are more sensitive to the marginal change of order book components than the 
sellers in the bearish market.  This is consistent to the findings that buyers are most 
likely to be more informative than the sellers as documented in Griffiths et al (2000) 
and Saar (2002). 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews relevant 
literatures and formulates the hypotheses.  Section 3 presents the descriptive statistics 
of trades, orders, and limit order book, and shows the shape of limit order book and its 
intraday pattern.  Section 4 examines the order sequence, order flow symmetry and 
determination of order aggressiveness. Section 5 summarizes the chapter. 
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2 Literature Review and Hypotheses  
 
2.1 Shape of Limit Order Book 
Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) examined the spread and the depth between 
adjacent quotes in the order book on the Paris Bourse.  They found that the spreads, 
excluding the bid-ask spread, on each side of the book were relatively constant, but 
the bid-ask spread was more than twice as large as other spreads.  Furthermore, the 
depth at the market was lower than the depth away from the market.  Market depth on 
the Paris Bourse only reflected a small portion of overall liquidity, and the other 
depths away from the market were not significantly different.  Al-Suhaibani and 
Kryzanowski (2000) found that the shape of order book of the SSM was weakly 
concave near the second quote and convex thereafter.  They reasoned that the order 
book at the market had a more pronounced adverse selection problem, resulting to a 
wide inside spread and small depth at the market.   
Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) nonetheless reported the nonlinearity price 
schedule on the SSE.  The average quoted volume was higher near the market and 
lower volume away from the market on the bid and ask side.  Unlike the Paris Bourse 
and the SSM, the spread at the market was lower than other spreads away from the 
market.  This result showed that the price schedule of Paris Bourse was weakly 
concave, a narrow spread and large volume away from the market, but the order book 
of the SSE is convex, a wide spread and small volume away from the market.  
Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) argued that the opposing result between the SSE and the 
Paris Bourse came from a large minimum tick size on the SSE.  Swedish and NYSE 
stocks have a similar minimum relative spread.  Most Swedish stocks trade at prices 
between SEK 20 and SEK 500 and have minimum relative spread between 0.20 and 
2.5 percent, while Harris (1991) reported that most NYSE stocks traded at prices 
between 5 USD and 50 USD, implying a minimum relative spread of 0.25 and 2.5 per 
cent.  However, tick sizes at the most relevant price range on the Paris Bourse are 
only a tenth of ones on the Stockholm Stock Exchange.   
According to Harris (1991, 1994), the minimum tick size reflects a trade-off 
between the costs and benefits of nonzero tick.  The minimum tick size causes the 
discrete price spreads and increases the execution cost of the liquidity demanders.  
However, the minimum tick size motivates limit order traders to provide the liquidity 
by enforcing a minimum compensation, and order precedence rules for the liquidity 
suppliers.  Furthermore, the minimum tick size simplifies the information sets and 
decreases the negotiation cost.  
The limit order traders provide the liquidity and earn the spread to offset for an 
asymmetric information risk when they trade against an informed trader.  The limit 
order traders may choose to provide less liquidity at the market to avoid being 
“picked-off” by the more informed trader. Consequently, the high information 
asymmetry results in the concave price schedule with the wide spread and small 
volume at the best quote.  Hence, the large tick size should be attractive to the 
liquidity trader in the strict time priority limit order market because the limit order 
trader receives a higher payment for liquidity supplying and compensates for the 
adverse selection cost.  Harris (1994) showed that the depth is positively associated 
with the minimum tick size.  As a result, the SSE has a narrow bid ask spread and 
large market depth which is opposite to the Paris Bourse.  This argument is also 
applied to the SSM, which has a relatively lower minimum tick size similar to the 
SSE.  Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000) showed that a cross sectional mean and 
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median transaction price are SR 196.07 and SR 111.81, while the minimum tick size 
for all stocks on the SSM is SR 1, which is approximately transformed into a 
minimum relative spread of 0.51 per cent and 0.89 per cent of trade price. 
This paper aims to provide further evidence regarding the impact of 
asymmetric information, and minimum tick size to the curvature of the order book. 
During a period of study, the 57% of total trades on the SET are transacted between 
Baht 10 and Baht 50 baht or a minimum relative spread of 0.50% to 2.5%.  The mean 
and median of trade price of 141 stocks are Baht 50.75 and Baht 24.08, with the 
cross-sectional minimum relative spread of 0.99 per cent and 1.04 per cent 
respectively.  Comparatively, the observed minimum relative spread on the SET is 
wider than many other limit order markets.  Angel (1997) reported that the relative 
tick size for 2,517 stocks covered by Morgan Stanley Capital International’s 
perspective was 0.38%.  Comparing to the SET, New Zealand is the only other 
country out of 22 countries where its stocks have the larger relative tick size of 
1.83%.  Consequently, this study aims to shed some light on the role of asymmetric 
information, and the minimum tick size to explain the shape of the limit order book.  
The order book characteristic on the SET should be consistent with the following 
hypotheses.   
 
Hypothesis 1: Bid-ask spread is wider than other spreads away from the market. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Depth at the best quote is thinner than the depth away from the market. 
 
Hypothesis 3: Convexity of price schedule of the order book is positively associated 
with the size of minimum tick size and negatively associated to degree of asymmetric 
information.  
 
2.2 Intraday Variation of Order Book 
It is well-known that a bid ask spread on the NYSE exhibits a U-shape pattern 
as shown in McInish and Wood (1992).  An intraday variation of spread infers the 
variation of either an inventory or an asymmetric information cost.  As mentioned by 
Madhavan (1992), trade incorporates information into price, so adverse selection 
problem should be alleviated over the trading day.  Therefore, the portion of 
asymmetric information cost included in the bid-ask spread should decline, and 
consequently makes the total bid-ask spread fall throughout trading day.  However, a 
higher spread in NYSE at the closing reflects the monopolist power of a specialist.  
Chan, Chung and Johnson (1995) compared the intraday pattern of spreads for 
actively traded CBOE options and their NYSE traded underlying stocks.  They found 
that while both options and their underlying stocks have a wide spread at the open, the 
option spreads are narrowest at the close while stock spreads become wide again.  
Such results arise from the differences in the underlying market architecture, where 
the CBOE has competing market makers whereas the NYSE has monopolist market 
makers.  Market makers use spread to manage an imbalance in their inventory by 
increasing bid or lowering ask quotes to attract orders from other dealers thereby 
decrease the inside spread.  Chan, Christie and Schultz (1995) also found that the bid-
ask spread for NASDAQ stocks declines throughout the day.  This leads to the 
following hypotheses. 
Depth in the order book reflects the level of liquidity to trade. Liquidity 
providers, although receive spread to compensate for their inventory costs and the 
adverse selection risk, usually lost when they trade with the informed traders.  
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Consequently, the depth at different price limits in an order book should increase 
throughout the trading day because the degree of asymmetric information declines 
over the course of trading.  The following hypotheses should hold.   
 
Hypothesis 4: Spread is the widest at the opening and continually declines to the 
narrowest at the closing.   
 
Hypothesis 5: Depth is the smallest at the opening and continually increases to the 
largest at the closing.   
 
Hypothesis 6: Length of order book is the shortest at the opening and continually 
increases to the longest at the closing. 
 
2.3 Order Sequences  
Previous studies have documented a conditional order flow pattern so called a 
diagonal effect, referring to a higher likelihood to observe a given type of order after 
the event just occurred than it would be unconditionally.  After an arrival of limit buy 
order submitted at the best bid price, an incoming order is most likely to be the same 
order type, for instance.  This result was firstly documented in Biais, Hillion and Spatt 
(1995) in Paris Bourse, followed by Al-Suhaibani and Kryznowski (2000) on the 
Saudi Stock Market.  Biais, et al (1995) offered three explanations to the diagonal 
effect: a strategic order splitting, a trade imitation, or a similar reaction to information 
event.  These explanations apply to the continuation in the large marketable limit 
order and new orders at or away from the quotes on one side of the book.  Diagonal 
effect of a new limit order within the quote reflects the front running among liquidity 
suppliers.  It is very likely to observe the diagonal effect on the SET.    
 
Hypothesis 7: Diagonal effect is prevalent across the market/limit and buy/sell 
orders.  
 
A liquidity trader may prefer using a series of small orders to one large order 
to reduce the price impact.  Insiders split their orders to minimize an informational 
disclosure.  When splitting order, traders pause after submitting their orders and wait 
either for additional liquidity or wait to conceal their intentions.  After waiting for the 
re-filled liquidity, they may resume the order submission if the expected benefit 
exceeds the cost of doing so, or until the private information is fully incorporated to 
the price.  Biais, et al (1995) therefore proposed that long order time elapse during the 
period of wide spread would be consistent with the splitting hypothesis, and the short 
order time elapse would be consistent with trading replication, and similar reactions.  
In addition, Hedvall and Niemeyer (1996) employed the dataset that includes dealer 
identities to investigate the order flows dynamic on the Helsinki Stock Exchange.  
Their empirical results are in line with an order splitting hypothesis more than a 
strategy replication. 
The diagonal effect may occur because of trade imitation, in which a trader 
follows a strategy used by other traders, who are presumed to be informed traders.  
On the emerging stock market such as the SET, foreign investors are usually 
perceived to have superior information compared to local investors.  Froot, 
O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) found that daily international portfolio flows in 44 
countries have a strong association with the past return.  Moreover, local emerging 
stock markets are positively associated to the inflow of the fund.  Choe, Kho, and 
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Stulz (1999) examined positive feedback trading and herding by foreign investors 
before and after the period of the 1997 Korea's economic crisis.  Although foreign 
investor exhibit a positive feedback effect prior to the crisis, they find that the herding 
falls during the crisis and the market adjusted quickly and efficiently to large sales by 
foreign investors. 
A diagonal effect could be a result of a same reaction to an information event. 
Wermers (1999) showed that the degree of herding among institutional investors is 
higher to buy (sell) stocks in the US that have experienced extreme positive (negative) 
returns in the previous quarter.  Al-Suhaibani and Kryznowski (2000), although could 
not observe traders’ identification, inferred the proportion of the same trader 
participated in two subsequent events from the order originated from the same 
package, which should belong to one trader.  They found that this proportion accounts 
for 28.94% of all the order flow events, and the percentages of the same trader 
subsequent events are larger for most events, which is consistent with the order 
splitting hypothesis.  Furthermore, they showed that the hidden order also has a 
diagonal effect.  This result suggests that a similar reaction to information events is 
the explanation of diagonal effect because the hidden order is unobserved so it is 
impossible to mimic a hidden order placement.   
The database does not contain a trader’s identification that would allow for a 
direct test of the trade imitation and the similar response of trader.  However, a 
comparison of the conditional order time interval could shed some light on the order 
splitting hypothesis.  Informed traders are likely to trade fast, break a large order to 
conceal themselves, and submit aggressive orders to increase the probability of 
execution to get the most out of their private information.  Hence, the time interval 
conditional on the less aggressive order should be longer than the time interval 
conditional on the aggressive order.  Uninformed traders decide to break the order 
volume to reduce the price impact, so the order time interval conditional on the wide 
spread should be longer than unconditional time because they are waiting for an 
additional liquidity. 
 
Hypothesis 8: The order submission sequence exhibits the diagonal effect.  
 
Hypothesis 9: The order waiting time conditioned on the small bid-ask spread and 
the arrival of aggressive order event are smaller than the order waiting time 
conditioned on the large bid-ask spread and the arrival of non-aggressive order 
event.  
 
2.4 Determinants of Order Aggressiveness 
Under the market maker system, traders only decide whether to trade at the 
single price quoted by the market maker and how many shares to trade.  However, the 
limit order market allows traders to place the order price and order volume that suits 
their strategy.  The order submission decision in the limit order market therefore 
becomes a very important issue for the trader.  An optimal trading strategy depends 
on several things including the state of limit order book, the order flows, the 
sentiment, and the utility function of investor.   
Seppi (1997) applied a static games model to investigate the creation of limit 
order book from a competition between the monopolist specialists on the NYSE, limit 
order traders, and floor-traders, and how market order traders behave in response to 
such relationship.  Parlour (1998) pointed out that the likelihood of limit order 
execution depends both on the state of the book and the expected market orders over 
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the rest of the day.  She used a dynamic model of order book in a one-tick market, 
where a trader determines a placement strategy conditional on the previous order 
submission and the state of the limit order book to show that, even in the absence of 
asymmetric information and a random arrival of trader types, several order sequence 
patterns still exist.  She argued that the existence of order sequence patterns can be 
explained by a “crowding out” mechanism, which arises from the price and priority 
rule.  Specifically, a volume at each price in the limit order book represents the queue 
of limit order traders according to the arrival time.  After a trader places a buy (sell) 
limit order, a subsequent buy (sell) limit order trader would find it unattractive to 
place the limit buy (sell) order at the same price or lower (higher) price because a long 
queue results in a lower chance of execution.  Handa, Swartz, and Taiwari (2003) 
used the thickness of the bids and offers to proxy for the proportion of high and low-
valuation traders.  When the buy competition is higher from the higher proportion of 
high-value investors, the uncertainty of a limit buy order execution declines, and 
market buy order is more attractive.  The crowding out mechanism infers the 
following hypothesis.      
 
Hypothesis 10: Order aggressiveness is positively associated with the thickness of 
market depth on the same side of the book, and negatively associated with the 
thickness of market depth on the opposite side of the book. 
On one hand, bid-ask spread is the cost for trader who demands an immediate 
transaction.  On the other hand, limit order trader receives the bid-ask spread to 
compensate for his/her inventory and adverse selection cost.  Wider bid-ask spread 
therefore encourages both liquidity and informed trader to use limit order.    
 
Hypothesis 11: Bid-ask spread is negatively associated with the order 
aggressiveness.  
 
Unlike the trading in the market maker system, where trader only observes the single 
quote of spread and depth, the trader in the limit order market can observe more than 
a single quote.  For example on the Paris Bourse, Swiss Stock Exchange, or 
Australian Stock Exchange, the trader is able to see the whole limit order book.  
However, in some limit order markets, the electronic limit order book is not fully 
visible to investors such as the SET which allows the three best bids and asks, the 
Saudi Stock Exchange allows two best bids and asks.  The trader in the limit order 
market is likely to make use of information beyond the bid-ask spread and market 
depth to decide the submission strategy.  Harris (1994) pointed out that due to a 
discrete tick size and time priority, there is a first mover advantage.  Additionally, due 
to the crowding out and front-running mechanism, limit order traders compete against 
each other to move up in the queue.  Consequently, the following hypotheses should 
hold.  
 
Hypothesis 12: Displayed depths which are away from the best quote in both sides of 
the order book are positively associated with the order aggressiveness.     
 
Hypothesis 13: Displayed price spreads excluding bid-ask spreads in both sides of 
the book are positively associated with the order aggressiveness. 
 
Past literatures show that different traders utilize different placement 
strategies.  Griffiths et al. (2000) compared the excess returns on stocks of executed 
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orders according to the degree of aggressiveness over three-months after execution.  
They found that the information-based trades are more likely to associate with the 
aggressive buyers than sellers.  Similarly, Saar (2001) showed that institutional 
trading on the buy side of the book is more likely to be information-motivated trade.  
Hedvall, Niemeyer, and Rosenqvist (1997) pointed out that while the order 
submission of buyers and sellers are symmetrical in general, the order submission for 
the most aggressive traders of buyers and sellers are not symmetrical.  Large buy 
trades are more often split into smaller trades than sell trade.   
Ranaldo (2003) found that the market order traders and limit order traders 
have opposite responses to changes in the bid-ask spread, market depth, time elapsed 
and volatility.  Limit (Market) order traders become more (less) aggressive when the 
bid-ask spread is wide, and the opposite market depth is thick, and the stock price is 
volatile.  However, when the same-side market depth is thick and the order wait time 
is long, the limit (market) order traders are less (more) aggressive. Ranaldo (2003) 
further argued that a market sentiment should play a significant impact on the order 
placement strategy.  He found that during the bullish (bearish) market, sellers (buyers) 
become less concerned about the bid (ask) side of the order book.  In addition, the 
strong association between buyers’ (sellers’) aggressiveness and spread occur during 
the bearish (bullish) markets.  In addition, buyers are more responsive to adjust their 
placement strategy with respect to the available liquidity supply then the sellers.   
This study examines how the buyers and sellers adjust their order 
aggressiveness submission with respect to the limit order book both at the best quote 
and the displayed quote during the bullish and bearish markets.  We compare the 
responsiveness of momentum traders and contrarian traders to the change of limit 
order book.  When the price is increasing, contrarian traders are the sellers, and when 
the price is falling, contrarian traders are buyers.  As mention above, momentum 
traders could be the noise traders who imitate the submission strategy of informed 
traders or the uninformed index traders who replicate the index movement.  In 
contrast, Griffith et al. (2000), who concluded that buyers are more informative than 
sellers, examined the Toronto Stock Exchange during June to September 1997, and 
the return of TSE 200, which is comprised of small and mid cap stocks, is 18.09%, 
while the large-cap TSE 100 index gains 8.45%.  In other words, the finding suggests 
that momentum traders are more informed.  Uninformed trader should respond 
stronger to the change of limit order book than the informed trader because it is the 
only information they have.  As discussed above, we expect the following hypotheses. 
 
Hypothesis 14: Buyers and Sellers have different order placement strategies with 
respect to the state of limit order book and the market sentiment. 
 
Hypothesis 15: Limit order traders and market order traders oppositely respond to 
the change in limit order book.  
 
Hypothesis 16: Contrarian traders are more responsive to the change in limit order 
book than the momentum traders.  
 
3 Analysis of Limit Order Book  
 
3.1 Data Description  
We use the data of the trade and order file of all listed stocks on the SET 
during the year 1997.  The limit order book of illiquid securities is more likely not as 
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informative as the actively traded security.  As shown in Ding and Chareonwong 
(2003), the bid-ask spreads of thinly traded futures contract computed from days with 
trades are more informative than those computed from days without trades.  Hence, 
we require that the selected stocks must have at least 120 trading days with a 
minimum of 20 trades a day in order to ascertain that a limit order book consists of at 
least the bid-ask quote in most of the trading period.  These criteria reduce the data 
from 457 stocks to 141 stocks.   Although the number of selected stocks consists of 
only less than one-third of the whole number of stocks, the market capitalization and 
trading volume of the selected stocks comprises of 80.57% and 83.75% of the whole 
stock market during the year 1997 respectively.  Past studies on the pure limit order 
market explored a small number of stocks, covered a short period of time, or only 
examined a specific part in the order book especially the quote at the market.  Biais, 
Hillion and Spatt (1995) performed an early study on the price schedule of the limit 
order book and the successive order flow pattern on the Paris Bourse.  Their dataset 
covered 19 trading days of 40 stocks listed on the CAC 40 index; Al-Suhaibani and 
Kryznowski (2000) and Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) performed a similar analysis 
with only 56 stocks and 30 stocks on the Saudi Stock Market (SSM) and on the 
Stockholm Stock Exchange (SSE) respectively. 
 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Table 1 Panel A compares the cross-sectional statistics of trades in the 
morning and afternoon session.  On average, there are 333 orders arrival a day, 
equivalent to 1.83 million shares, or 65 million baht.  Trading volume is 
approximately half of order volume in terms of number of trade, and only one-fourth 
in term of shares traded.  Large stocks have higher trading volume and lower return 
volatility compared with small stocks.  The number of buy order is almost equal to 
number of sell order.  About one-third of total order results in an immediate 
execution.  The proportion of sell and immediate executed orders are higher for small 
stocks.  In addition, the price conditional order, e.g. fill or kill, immediate-or-cancel, 
at the market opening, is only 0.14% of total order.  Canceled orders comprise of 
21.17% of total order, and most of them are canceled by firm, not by the ASSET.  
Large stocks have higher canceled order than small stocks.   
In the panel B of Table 1, the limit order book on both bid and ask quotes on 
the SET is prevalent 92.27% of the trading time, and the non-empty order book is 
likely to occur in a large stock.  Saudi Stock Market however has only 1.51% and 
1.19% of total trading time when the first best bid or ask is unavailable.  The relative 
spread is 3.38%, while the cross-sectional average of minimum relative spread is 1%.  
The absolute spread is 1.13 baht.  Large stocks have lower relative spread, but higher 
absolute spread.  This is because large stocks usually have a higher price and larger 
minimum tick size, measured in baht.  The market depth, displayed depth, and total 
depth is higher for large stock compared to small stock.  The length of book, length of 
bid and ask side are 13.90, 6.40, and 7.50 respectively.  Large stocks have longer 
length of book in both bid and ask side.        
 
3.2 Shape of Limit Order Book 
The SET displays up to three quotes on both sides of the order book to the 
public investor, while only the market surveillance can see the entire order book.  The 
order book is reconstructed using the data from the order and trade file.  We report the 
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spreads between adjacent quotes and the depths at the three displayed quotes and the 
next three un-displayed quotes.     
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Table 2 shows the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard deviation of time-series 
average of relative spread, absolute spread, and depth.  The relative and absolute bid-
ask spreads of the sample are 3.38% and 1.13 baht, higher than 1.79% on the SSM, 
and 1.36% on the SSE, see Al-Suhaibani and Kryzanowski (2000) and Niemeyer and 
Sandas (1993).  Angel (1997) reported that the median of relative bid ask spread in 
fifteen major market indices is only 0.65%.  The wide relative spread on the SET is 
partially due to a large minimum tick size rule.  The minimum tick size on the SET is 
approximately 1% on average trade price, which is twice of 0.51% minimum tick size 
on the Saudi Stock Exchange.  In addition, Thailand faced a currency crisis during 
1997 and the SET index fell more than 50%.  The bid-ask spread is the widest 
compared with all other spreads on both sides of the order book.  Bid price spreads 
away from the quote are wider than the spread near the quote, but the ask price 
spreads are relatively constant.  The relative (absolute) spreads are 2.14% (0.66 baht) 
for the first bid spread, and 4.07% (0.74 baht) for the fifth bid spread, but the relative 
(absolute) spreads are 1.86% (0.57 baht) for the first ask spread and 1.66% (0.59 baht) 
for the fifth ask spread.   
The depth at the best bid is 33,880 shares, the highest on the bid side, while 
the depth at the best ask is 20,414 shares, the lowest on the ask side.  This result is 
quite surprising because it indicates that a limit order buyer is willing to submit more 
aggressive order than a limit order seller even on the bearish market.  Depths at other 
price limits are not much different from their best quote depth.  Depths at the sixth bid 
(ask) quote are 31,932 shares and 24,400 shares on average.  We test the equality of 
price spreads and depths quotes by regressing the time-series average value with the 
sets of dummy variables that represents the quote order as follows. 
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where Spreadi is the time-series average value of price spread computed from the 
difference in the price limits at successive quotes. Depthj is the number of shares at a 
particular quote in the order book.  The explanatory variables are the group of dummy 
variables that equal to one if the observations of the dependent variable belong to the 
certain quote in the order book.  The number of observations in equation 1 and 2 are 
1,551 (141x11) and 1,692 (141x12) respectively. 
   
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Table 3 presents the Wald statistics of the equality of spreads and depths at all six 
successive quotes.  Although the hypothesis that displayed spreads including bid-ask 
spread are equal is rejected, we can not reject the equality hypothesis of displayed 
price spreads excluding bid-ask spread.  In other words, the bid-ask spread is wider 
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than other price spread, and the size of displayed bid spread is not statistically 
different from the displayed ask spread.  In contrast, the best bid and the best ask 
depths are not significantly different from the depth at other displayed quotes.  
Comparing the displayed and undisplayed spread and depth, we find that the 
displayed and undisplayed spread are statistically different on the bid side but they are 
indifferent on the ask side.  In other words, the price spread further away from the 
best quote is wider only on the bid side and the spreads are constant on the ask side.  
The depths of displayed and undisplayed quote on both sides of order book are not 
significantly different.    
 The distribution of the liquidity within the limit order book could be visualized 
through the plot of the price limit deviation from the best quote mid point on the 
vertical axis against the cumulative depth from the best quote on the horizontal axis.  
The positive (negative) value of price limit deviation and the cumulative depth refers 
to the bid (ask) side of the order book.  If the price spreads between successive price 
limits and the depths are equal across the limit order book, the order book would then 
exhibit a straight line relationship.     
 
[Insert Figure 1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 here] 
 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 present the hypothetical convex and concave order book 
respectively.  The hypothetical convex order book is plotted from the book that has 
the price spreads monotonically increase and depths monotonically decrease away 
from the market.  In other words, the liquidity distribution of convex order book is 
concentrated near the best quotes than away from the market, and the execution cost 
per shares traded is positively associated with the size of market order.  From figure 3, 
the limit order book of SET is approximately linear on the sell side and weakly 
convex on the buy side.  The displayed bid and ask side of the order book are 
approximately linear.  Nevertheless, the undisplayed bid side exhibits a weakly 
convex shape as a result of wider spreads further away from the best quote, but the 
undisplayed ask side is not significantly deviated from the linearity.  Wide 
undisplayed bid spreads might reflect the high degree of asymmetric information for 
the buyers on the bearish market.  Since the buyers are concerned about being picked 
off by the informed traders, they either submit a more aggressive limit buy order, 
expecting quick execution or submit a more conservative order, expecting to receive a 
larger spread to compensate for higher asymmetric information risks.      
 Biais, et al. (1995) reported that the order book on the Paris Bourse is slightly 
concave, where the depth at the market is smaller than the depth away from the 
market.  One may argue that the degree of transparency of the market could affect the 
shape of the order book.  This argument is not likely because both Stockholm Stock 
Exchange and Paris-Bourse show all the five best quotes, compared to the two and 
three best quotes on the Saudi Stock Exchange and the SET.  Nevertheless, our 
dataset does not allow for a direct test of the transparency impact and the shape of 
limit order book.  Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) reconciled their results to those of 
Biais, et al. (1995) by arguing that a larger tick size on the Stockholm Stock Exchange 
compared to the Paris Bourse is the reason.  The five displayed quotes of order book 
at the Stockholm Stock Exchange should cover a wider relative price range than the 
corresponding levels at the Paris Bourse.  Consequently, large tick size should be 
profitable to liquidity supplier.   
Apart from the tick size, the asymmetric information could affect the order 
placement behavior of liquidity providers and so does the shape of limit order book.  
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Liquidity providers are most likely facing a loss when trading against the informed 
trader, so they would shift the limit order placed at the market away from the market 
to receive wider price spreads as a cushion against the loss.  Lee, Mucklow and Ready 
(1993) found the wide bid-ask spread and thin market depths during the earning 
announcement period, when the degree of adverse selection is high.   
This study therefore examines how the relative tick size and degree of 
asymmetric information influences the distribution of liquidity within the order book.  
As mentioned in Amihud (2002), liquidity is an elusive concept, because it can not be 
directly observed and a single measure is unlikely to capture all aspects of liquidity.  
Spread and depth are widely used as a measure of liquidity.  In addition, the liquidity 
distribution should reflect the variation of the price spreads and depths across price 
limits on the order book.  To combine these aspects of liquidity together, we define 
the new variable so called “convexity”, which could be defined as follows.  
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where Sk and Dk are the limit price differences from the mid quote and the cumulative 
depth at the kth away from the market.  ∆Slopek is the change in price schedule slope 
at the kth away from the market. Convexity is the average of ∆Slopek.  The zero 
convexity indicates a linear relationship between the limit price difference from the 
mid quote and the cumulative depth.  In other words, the depths and prices spread at 
the market are approximately the same as those away from the market.   
The positive convexity implies either the spread away from the market is 
wider than the spread at the market, or the depth away from the market is smaller than 
the depth at the market.  The negative convexity or the concavity implies either the 
spread away from the market is narrower than the spread at the market, or the depth 
away from the market is larger than the depth at the market.  The majority of the 
stocks in the dataset, 95 stocks out of 141 stocks, have a positive convexity.  When 
the convexity on the bid side and on the ask side are computed separately, the number 
of positive convexity securities are 108 stocks on the bid side and 47 stocks on the ask 
side.  This indicates that the positive convexity of the order book comes from the bid 
side, because the price spreads on the bid side continually increase further away from 
the market.   
We investigate the relationship between the shape of order book, the tick size 
and the degree of asymmetric information through the following regression.  
  
iiiiii VolumeVolatilityFirmSizeTickSizeConvexity εβββββ +++++= 43210  (4) 
 
where Convexityi is the average of the slope difference of the price schedule; TickSizei 
is the minimum relative price spread; FirmSizei is the market capitalization; Volatilityi 
is the trade price volatility; Volumei  is the trading volume.  All the variables are 
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standardized by subtracting the cross-sectional mean and divided by the standard 
deviation. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the determinants of the liquidity distribution within the limit order 
book.  Minimum tick size is negatively associated with the market capitalization, -
0.26, and positively associated with the daily volatility, 0.57.  Firm size is negatively 
associated with the daily volatility, -0.39.  The results indicated the positive 
coefficients for minimum tick size and firm size, and the negative coefficient for 
volatility.  Such relationships are consistent to the hypotheses discussed in section 2.1.  
Securities with large tick size have more convex order books compared to the 
securities with small tick size.  In other words, the findings support the argument of 
Niemeyer and Sandas (1993) that the difference in the shape of order book is 
influenced by a difference in minimum tick size rule.  Moreover, high information 
asymmetry securities e.g. small firms, and high volatility are likely to have a concave 
order book compared to the low information asymmetry securities.  This shows that 
the liquidity distribution within the order book is sensitive to the degree of 
asymmetric information.   
We perform a robustness check by separating the dataset into two sub-samples 
according to the market capitalization and the relative tick size.  The findings 
indicated that the impact of minimum tick size to the convexity of order book only 
occurred in small firms, and was insignificant for large firms.  Moreover, the study 
examined whether the determinants of order convexity on the bid side would be 
different from the ask side, and the findings indicated no different relationship 
between the bid side and the ask side.   
     
3.3 Intraday Variation of Limit Order Book  
We investigated intraday patterns of order book from the regression of the variables 
of interest with the time of the day and the day of the week dummies as follows.  
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where Ykt denotes the variables of interest which consist of Complete Quote, Length 
of Order Book, Length of Bid, Length of Ask, Bid-Ask Spread, Price Spread of the 
Best Bid Price and Last Displayed Bid price (B1-B3), Price Spread of Best Ask price 
and the Last Displayed Ask Price (A3-A1), Market Depth, Displayed Depth, Total 
Depth, Proportion of Displayed Depth. Note that B1 (A1), B2 (A2), B3 (A3) are the 
price limit at the first, second and third best quote on the bid (ask) side.  The length of 
an order book refers to the number of different price limits in the order book with 
shares quoted.       
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 exhibits that the existence of an intraday pattern of order book.  The order 
book is more likely to consist of both bid and ask quote in the morning session or on 
Monday than in the afternoon session or a later day of the week.  This finding 
indicated that after trade occurred and took liquidity away from the order book, a new 
liquidity is not refilled immediately.  The length of order book, bid side, and ask side 
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are the lowest after the market opens, the highest before the market closes. This 
suggests that a limit order trader who provides liquidity at a later time of the day 
submits his quote further away from the best quote.  The placement strategy of this 
trader group is likely to hedge the position or set up a cut-loss limit in case of 
unfavorable price movement, and they do these placements after trading takes place 
for a while.   
Furthermore, the results show that all displayed spreads become narrower as 
the trading time goes by.  Bid ask spread exhibits a downward intraday pattern, where 
it is highest in the first 30 minute interval and lowest in the last 30 minute interval.  
Other displayed spreads on both bid and ask sides such as the first and second bid 
spread, (B1-B2) and (B2-B3), show a similar downward pattern.  The findings are 
consistent to the argument of Madhavan (1992) that asymmetric information cost is 
alleviated after trading because more information is incorporated into the price.  In a 
period of high adverse selection cost, limit order traders would make a loss if they 
trade against a better informed trader.  Consequently, the liquidity supplier is 
unwilling to provide the liquidity during a period of high asymmetric information.    
The intraday variation of liquidity in the order book shown in table 4 supports 
this argument.  The market depth, displayed depth, and total depth are at the minimum 
in the first 30 minutes of trading day, and they increase as trade continues.  The level 
of liquidity reaches its maximum during the last 30 minutes of trading day.  Volumes 
in the order book, which are bid and ask volumes and at the market and away from the 
market volumes, follow an upward pattern.         
 
4 Analysis of Order Flow 
An investigation of the order flow pattern on the SET is done by considering 
an order in 3 different characteristics: buy or sell order, market or limit order, and the 
aggressiveness level.  The total number of buy and sell orders for 141 stocks are 
approximately equal at 4.69 million orders, while the number of market and limit 
orders are 2.76 and 6.62 million orders respectively.  We classify an incoming order 
as a market order if the order results in an execution immediately or the order entering 
time stamp are less than the trade time stamp within one-tenth of a second.  Orders are 
categorized into 9 aggressiveness levels according to the order price and volume 
relative to the price limit and shares available in the order book.  The aggressiveness 
of limit order starts from the least aggressive level 1 to level 5, and the market order 
which results in an immediate execution has the aggressive level starting from 6 to the 
most aggressive level 9.  The proportion of each aggressive category is reported in 
table 6.    
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
The most aggressive order, level 9, is the market buy (sell) order with an order 
price higher (lower) than the best ask (bid) price and the order size larger than the 
shares available in the ask (bid) side of the order book prior to the entering.  Only 
0.43% and 0.38% of total buy and sell orders are in the level 9.  The second most 
aggressive order, level 8, is the large market buy (sell) order, that its price equal to the 
best ask (bid) price and its size is larger than the available best quote in the order 
book.  Orders at this level represent 8.15% of total buy orders and 8% of total sell 
orders.  These two order types are considered as market orders even though after 
execution the remaining shares become limit order in the order book.  Order 
aggressiveness level 7 is the market buy (sell) order with the order price higher than 
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the prevailing ask (bid) side but its volume is smaller than the prevailing offer (bid) 
quote volume. These order types represent only 0.68% and 0.57% of the total buy and 
sell orders.  The least market order aggressiveness is level 6, which are market buy 
(sell) order with order price equal to the best ask (bid) price and its volume less than 
prevailing ask (bid) shares.  These orders are the major portion of market orders 
because they consist of 21.17% and 19.51% of total buy and sell orders.   
For the limit order, aggressive order at level 5 is limit buy (sell) order that 
narrow the bid-ask spread because its price is higher than the best bid (offer) price.  
They represent 7.41% and 7.62% of total orders.  The limit buy (sell) order that 
arrives when the limit order book on bid (ask) side is empty has the aggressiveness 
level 4.  Only 0.31% and 0.27% of total buy and sell orders is of this order type.  
Order aggressiveness at level 3 is limit buy (sell) orders with order price equal to the 
best bid (ask) price.  These orders contain 26.70% and 24.77% of total buy and sell 
orders, and this order class is the majority of limit orders.  Order aggressiveness at 
level 2 is limit buy (sell) order with order price lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) 
price but higher (lower) than the third bid (ask) price.  The proportions of this order 
type are 19.77% and 21.16% for the buy and sell orders.  The least order 
aggressiveness, level 1 order, is the limit buy (sell) order with order price lower 
(higher) than the third bid (ask) price.  The orders in this class represent 15.38% and 
17.71% of total buy and sell orders.  The empirical frequencies are computed based 
on all orders of 141 stocks.     
 
4.1 Order Sequences 
Table 5 shows the conditional likelihood of order arrival according to the level 
of order aggressiveness.  We observe the “diagonal effect” in the conditional order 
arrival as reported in Biais, et al. (1995).  An incoming order is likely to be the same 
aggressiveness level and the same buy/sell order as the previous order, especially for 
the limit order.  For instance, after the limit buy order with the best bid price is 
submitted, the likelihood that the same limit buy order type will arrive is higher than 
other order types.  The diagonal effect is very strong for the limit order, and the least 
aggressive for the market order.  For the limit orders further away from the displayed 
quotes, LB1 and LS1, the following order is likely to be the same order type with a 
conditional probability of 21.47% and 19.43% for buy and sell orders respectively.  
Probabilities of observing market buy (sell) order with order price higher (lower) than 
the ask (bid) price and the volume less than the best quote conditional on the same 
order type are the highest among other types, and they equal to 33.60% and 31.72% 
for the buy and sell orders.      
 
4.2 Order Flow Symmetry  
An order arrival conditional on buy order is likely to be a buy order rather than 
a sell order for 140 stocks.  Due to the diagonal effect, the probability of a buy order 
followed by a sell order, Pr[St|Bt-1], equals to 0.42, and it is less than the probability of 
a buy order followed by a buy order, Pr[Bt|Bt-1], which equals to 0.58.  Similarly, for 
all 141 stocks, the probability of a sell order followed by a buy order, Pr[Bt|St-1], 
equals to 0.40, lower than the probability of sell order continuation, Pr[St|St-1], which 
equals to 0.60.  Furthermore, the probability of sell continuation is higher than the 
probability of buy continuation in 106 stocks out of 141 stocks.  The higher sell 
continuation may simply be a result of the SET downturn during 1997.  Ranaldo 
(2003) reported that, on the SWX, the probability of a market and limit sell order 
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continuation were lower than the probability of a market and limit buy order 
continuation, and the SWX during that period was a bullish market.  
An alternative explanation is that sellers are more likely to have herding 
behavior, resulting in a panic sell.  In other words, buy order is more informative than 
the sell order. Griffiths et al. (2001) proved that buy initiated trade is more 
informative than sell initiated trade.  This paper examines the informativeness of a 
buy order through a comparison of a proportion of incoming buy order and sell order 
conditional on the size of spread.  From Panel B, table 6, the proportion of buy order 
is higher under the wide spread.  The buy order arrival conditional on the small spread 
is 47.85%, and this proportion increases to 49.05% for the large spread.  This 
indicates that during a high  bid-ask spread which has a high adverse selection cost, 
buyers on average are slightly more informed than the sellers, so they are willing to 
trade-off between the higher execution cost and their private information.  An 
investigation of market and limit order combined with the buy and sell order provides 
the additional support of the informativeness of buy order.  A proportion of market 
order is inversely related to the spread size. Large spread increases the execution cost, 
and makes a limit order more attractive.  In addition, even on the bearish market, the 
proportion of market buy order is larger than the market sell order for all spread sizes.  
This shows that an informed trader is likely to be a buy trader, because they are 
willing to pay for the spread to get the fast execution due to the short-life of private 
information.  Owing to the bearish market, the limit sell order occurs more frequently 
than a limit buy order.  
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Based on the crowding out mechanism without considering the impact of 
asymmetric information, Parlour (1998) made several predictions, as shown in table 7 
panel B, regarding the order sequences.  Ranaldo (2003) found that the empirical 
order sequences on the SWX were consistent with 5 out of 8 predictions made by 
Parlour (1998).  The order sequences patterns on the SET are consistent with only half 
of Parlour (1998)’s predictions.  Furthermore, there is only one out of eight order 
sequences pattern that is consistent between the SET, Ranaldo (2003), and Parlour 
(1998).  The prediction that the probability of market sell order followed by market 
buy order, Pr[MBt|MSt-1], is lower than the probability of market buy order 
continuation.  The different findings on the SET from what Parlour (1998) predicted 
might be because of trader concern about the asymmetric information during a severe 
market downturn.  Additionally, the differences of our results and Ranaldo (2003) 
could reflect that traders place order differently in the bullish and bearish markets.  
We further analyze this issue in the determinants of order aggressiveness section.  
 
4.3 Order Time Interval 
Biais et al. (1995) explained that the diagonal effect could occur from an order 
splitting, a trading imitation and a similar reaction to the information.  As mentioned 
earlier, the record of trader type is unavailable in the dataset, so only the order 
splitting hypothesis is examined here.  Traders split the order to reduce a price impact 
or to conceal their private information.  To investigate the splitting order hypothesis, 
we compare the time interval of order submission when the period that a price impact 
or the degree of asymmetric information is high, which is the period of wide bid-ask 
spread.  If investors split the order submission, the time interval of order arrival when 
the spread is wide should be longer than the unconditional case because traders are 
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waiting for the additional liquidity in the order book to absorb the price impact or 
conceal the information. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Table 8 shows the time interval between orders conditional on the size of 
spread.  The unconditional time interval is 332.5 seconds.  The Wald statistics rejects 
the null hypothesis that the time intervals conditional on the spread size are equal.  
When the spread is large, the time interval is 378.1 seconds, larger than the 
unconditional case.  Furthermore, the time interval is shortened when the spread is 
narrow.  In other words, when the degree of asymmetric information is high, traders 
wait for a longer period than the unconditional case before placing the next order.  
Nevertheless, Biais et al. (1995) found the opposite result that the time interval of 
subsequent orders is lowest when the spread is wide in the Paris Bourse.  In addition, 
the average time of new ask or bid within quotes after large spread is lower than the 
unconditional case.  Biais et al. (1995) explained that after large liquidity shock, 
traders quickly supply the liquidity to gain the price and time priority.  We expect the 
difference between the SET and Paris Bourse arises from the bearish market and high 
information asymmetry on the SET.  
However, the longer time interval under the wide spread is not necessarily 
consistent with the order splitting hypothesis.  Usually, when the spread is high, the 
liquidity trader is likely to react quickly to maintain a time priority, while insiders, in 
order to maintain their private information, are willing to wait and observe the order 
book.  Easley and O’Hara (1992) showed that liquidity traders are more sensitive to 
the spread than the informed traders.  This is because spread is the direct cost to 
acquire the liquidity, while informed traders can offset the execution cost with their 
private information value.  As a result, a longer time interval period during the wide 
spread may simply reflect the waiting time of a liquidity trader.  To further examine 
the splitting hypothesis, we compute the time interval conditional on the order 
aggressiveness.  Because the information is short-lived, the order aggressiveness level 
should be positively associated with the informed trading.  The findings show that 
when the order becomes more aggressive, the time intervals are shortened for both a 
buy order and a sell order.  One may interpret this evidence as either the informed 
traders are clustering their orders not splitting the orders, or the liquidity trader are 
trying to imitate the informed trader.  In summary, this section does not find any 
evidence to support the order splitting hypothesis.   
 
5. Determinants of Order Aggressiveness 
This section aims to examine the impact of the order book beyond the best 
quote on the order aggressiveness.  Following Hausman, Lo, and MacKinlay (1992), 
Griffiths et al. (2000) and Ranaldo (2003), an ordered probit model is used to 
investigate the determinants of order aggressiveness.  The ordered probit model is 
appropriate because it is a generalization of linear regression model where the 
dependent variable consists of a finite number of values possessing a natural ordering.  
The model is shown in equation 6 below.  The equation is regressed separately for the 
case of positive and negative stock performance, where the price change during the 
last ten trades are positive and negative respectively.  
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where m starts from 2, 3, …, 5.  γm is the partition boundaries on the density function 
of Yt*, which is the normal distribution function.  Yt refers to the level of order 
aggressiveness.  Previous section has shown that with nine categories of order 
aggressive, some categories result in too few observations.  Hence, in this section we 
reduce the number of classifications to six levels.  Yt =1, 2, 3, and 4 for limit order 
placed behind the displayed quote, within the displayed quote, at the best quote, and 
improve the quote respectively; Yt = 5 and 6 for the market order at the best quote and 
the market order with trade size larger than the best quote or the price better than the 
best quote.  The explanatory variables are the standardized variables that represent the 
state of limit order book and market sentiment at the time prior to the order arrival.  
These variables are bid-ask spread, same and opposite spread, same and opposite 
market depth, same and opposite 2nd and 3rd depth, trade volatility, trade time elapsed, 
and order volume.  Bid-ask spread is the percentage relative spread.  Same (Opposite) 
spread is the percentage price difference between price at the best quote and price at 
the third best quote on the same (opposite) side of order type.  Same (Opposite) 
market depth is the number of shares available at the best bid (ask) side for buy order, 
and at the best ask (bid) side for sell order.  Same (Opposite) 2nd and 3rd depth is the 
shares at the second and best bid (ask) side for buy (sell) order.  Trade volatility is the 
standard deviation of the last 10 price changes.  Trade time elapsed is the average 
time interval between the last 10 trades.  Order volume is the number of shares in the 
order.   
 
 [Insert Table 9 here] 
 
Table 9 shows that the order book has the same direction impact on the order 
aggressiveness for the buyers and sellers, and the impacts are not much difference 
under the bullish and the bearish markets.  The bid-ask spread is negatively associated 
with the degree of order aggressiveness for both buyers and sellers and for both 
positive and negative sentiment markets.  While the large spread is costly for the 
market order, and it indicates high asymmetric information, a liquidity trader may find 
it optimal to submit less aggressive order such as a limit order instead of a market 
order.  Furthermore, the same spread is positively associated with the aggressiveness.  
According to the crowding out effect, the wide same spread indicates that there is still 
a room for a limit order to be placed a little ahead of the queue while and still expect 
to receive a high price spread if executed.  The size of opposite spread should affect 
the aggressiveness of a market order.  A wide opposite spread indicates high 
asymmetric information, signaled from the opposite side of the book, and it causes a 
market order trader to be more cautious and submit a less aggressive order.        
 The same market depth and other displayed depths are positively associated 
with the order aggressiveness. This crowding out effect forces a trader to compete for 
an execution.  High market depth on the same submission side indicates the long 
queue for the execution.  Trader therefore has to become more aggressive in order to 
gain a better chance of execution.  The opposite market depth is inversely associated 
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with the order aggressiveness.  Large opposite market depth indicates the higher 
chance of execution, which will shorten the order queue.  The trader therefore 
hesitates to use an aggressive strategy.   
 We perform a robustness check of order placement determination through the 
sub samples of the dataset categorized according to minimum tick size and market 
capitalization.  The results in all sub samples, e.g. large tick size security, small tick 
size security, large security and small security, are not significantly different and are 
consistent with the case of full dataset.  However, we hypothesize that different trader 
types should behave differently.  Ranaldo (2003) showed that the changes in the order 
flow components do not symmetrically affect the order placement of market order 
traders and limit order traders.  The marginal likelihood of a limit (market) buy order 
reacts negatively (positively) to an incremental volume on the bid side.  Moreover, 
buyers exhibit a stronger reaction to adjust their order aggressiveness submission than 
the sellers.  These analyses are done by computing the marginal probability of each 
order placement choice with respect to the trader types and change in the state of limit 
order book as follows.   
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where ][⋅φ  is the normal probability density function.   , for k = 1, …, 10, is the 
estimated coefficients from equation 6.  
kβˆ( )kXE  is the unconditional mean of 
explanatory variables. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Table 10 shows the marginal probability of different trader types in each order 
submission.  The findings show that limit order traders and market order traders 
respond oppositely to the change of limit order book, and these reactions are 
monotonic with the order aggressiveness.  When the bid-ask spread is wide, the 
likelihood of limit order traders’ submission increases because of the higher 
compensation for liquidity provision, while the likelihood of market order traders’ 
submission falls.  However, we would observe that the negative marginal probabilities 
of limit order traders become the positive marginal probabilities for market order 
traders when the price spreads between price at the best quote and at the third best 
quote on the same side increase, the market depth and the displayed depth on the same 
side increase.   
Moreover, the marginal probabilities of buyers are higher in the bearish period 
than in the bullish period.  Similarly, sellers have higher marginal probabilities in the 
bullish period than in the bearish period.  In other words, contrarian traders have a 
stronger response to the change in limit order book than momentum traders.  This 
result indicates that market movement puts pressure to traders on the opposite side of 
the market.  Additionally, the responses of momentum and contrarian traders are 
stronger in the bullish market than in the bearish market.     
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6. Conclusion  
An order book at any point in time represents an accumulation of limit orders 
after the market orders matching.  A change in the order book reflects the information 
flow, liquidity change, and trader expectation.  The order book therefore becomes an 
indispensable source of information for a trader to design an appropriate submission 
strategy.  The order book under a period of thin depth and wide spread may be a result 
of the liquidity shock or the high degree of information asymmetry.  Under this 
situation, market order submission is considered to be a costly strategy.  Uninformed 
trader should offer liquidity when it is expensive and consume liquidity when it is 
cheap.  Informed trader, on the other hand, carefully submits the order to maximize 
the private information value by either fast trade, hide their interests, or reduce price 
impact.  An understanding of the price schedules in the limit order book and how it 
relates to the order flow should be appreciated by all market participants. 
This study analyzes the shape of limit order book and order placement strategy 
on the SET.  We show that the order book of the SET exhibits a weakly convex shape 
on the bid side and relatively linear on the ask side.  Bid-ask spread is larger than 
other spreads away from the market.  Spreads away from the market are larger than 
the spread near the market on the bid side, but they are approximately equal on the 
ask side.  On the bid side, the depth at the market is the largest compared with the 
other depths away from the market, but on the ask side the depth at the market is the 
smallest.  Excluding the depths at the market, depths away from the market are not 
statistically different.   
We show that the variation of liquidity distribution within the order book is 
affected by the minimum tick size and the degree of adverse selection.  Consistent to 
the argument of Niemeyer and Sandas (1993), the order book of stocks with large 
minimum tick size are more convex than the order book of stocks with lower 
minimum tick size.  Moreover, the degree of convexity is negatively associated with 
the firm size, as proxy for the asymmetric information.   
While previous studies showed the existence of the intraday variation of bid-
ask spread and market depth, this study shows that the spread and depth away from 
the market have a similar intraday pattern as the spread and depth at the market.  The 
bid-ask spread and other price spread between the successive quotes are the widest at 
the opening period and become the narrowest at the closing period.  The market depth 
and other depths away from the market have an upward pattern, where they are at the 
lowest at the opening and increase to the highest at the closing. 
The order sequences of the SET also exhibit the diagonal effect, in which the 
probability that the same order type is likely to occur after this order type has just 
occurred than it would be unconditionally.  The time interval of orders conditional on 
the large spread is larger than unconditional time intervals which could be that 
uninformed traders split the order to avoid high price impact.  Time intervals 
subsequent to the aggressive order are smaller than the unconditional time interval 
may be either the splitting order from informed traders to camouflage themselves, the 
trading imitation of noise traders, or the herding behavior among traders, as pointed 
out by Biais et al. (1995).  A further study in the source of diagonal effect is called 
for.   
Lastly, we study how the limit order book determines the choice of order 
aggressivenss.  Consistent to the crowding out mechanism, the price spreads and 
depths at the best quote and the other displayed quotes are informative: order 
placement becomes aggressive during the period of narrow bid-ask spread, wide other 
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price spreads on the same and opposite side, thick market depths on the same side, 
thin market depths on the opposite side, and thick displayed depths on the same side.  
Moreover, we find that limit order traders respond to the limit order book in an 
opposite direction compared to market order traders, and the market movement 
usually forces traders in a counter direction to react more aggressively than traders in 
a same direction.  
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics of Order File, Trade File, and Limit Order Book  
This Table shows the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of order file, limit order 
book, and trade file of stocks listed on the SET.  Stock selection is based on two 
criteria.  First, an active trading day must have at least 10 trades.  Second, a selected 
stock must have the number of active trading days of at least 120 active trading days.  
The filtered dataset contains 141 stocks from the total 457 stocks.   
 Mean Median SD Min Max Corr. 
with 
firm 
size 
Panel A: Order File       
Number of order  333 175 432 34 2785 0.5261 
Order size (thousand shares) 1,831 827 2,812 67 19,635 0.3841 
Order value (million baht) 65.44 18.04 134.78 1.13 1,009.79 0.8195 
Buy order  0.5051 0.5139 0.0667 0.2597 0.7178 0.1508 
Limit order  0.7429 0.7426 0.0310 0.6316 0.8306 0.1555 
Matched orders 0.4627 0.4646 0.0474 0.3429 0.5749 0.0883 
Price conditional order  0.0014 0.0011 0.0012 0.0002 0.0102 0.0911 
Canceled order  0.2117 0.2098 0.0367 0.1019 0.2959 0.3052 
 
Panel B: Limit Order Book 
Complete quote   0.9227 0.9413 0.0617 0.6117 0.9936 0.3234 
Relative spread  0.0338 0.0298 0.0184 0.0084 0.1026 -0.4195 
Absolute spread (baht) 1.13 0.58 1.49 0.11 11.60 0.2702 
Quote midpoint (baht) 51.11 24.04 71.99 1.55 504.21 0.5215 
Market depth (thousand 
shares) 54.29 28.31 63.15 1.78 376.42 0.2781 
Displayed depth (thousand 
shares)  170.59 75.07 191.62 7.18 1,070.05 0.1997 
Total depth (thousand shares) 351.73 170.78 480.17 18.07 3,303.28 0.3405 
Length of book  13.90 13.32 5.12 4.14 29.09 0.6943 
Length of bid   6.40 5.86 2.69 1.59 14.81 0.6807 
Length of ask   7.50 7.15 2.59 2.17 14.46 0.6642 
 
Panel C: Trade File 
No. active trading days 200 215 46 120 247 0.3937 
Number of trades  159 82 211 17 1,281 0.5027 
Trade size (thousand shares) 417 201 661 12 4,615 0.3870 
Trade value (million baht) 15.10 4.01 31.61 0.25 230.05 0.8056 
Price (baht) 50.75 24.08 71.95 1.56 503.64 0.5228 
Daily return  0.0049 0.0032 0.0104 -0.0165 0.0480 -0.2767 
SD of return  0.0122 0.0099 0.0082 0.0030 0.0404 -0.3851 
Mean absolute return  0.0068 0.0045 0.0063 0.0007 0.0310 -0.3585 
Hi-Lo return  0.0608 0.0595 0.0172 0.0229 0.1093 -0.0179 
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Table 2. Successive Price Spreads and Depths of Limit Order Book 
This Table shows the cross-sectional descriptive statistics of price spreads and depths.  Price spreads are the difference of prices at successive 
levels of limit order book divided by the average of the successive prices.  For example, A1-B1 is the best bid price minus the best ask price and 
divided by the quote mid point.  Depths are the number of shares at each limit prices in the limit order book.  For example, B1 is the number of 
shares at the best bid price. 
 
Panel A Spread between Adjacent Levels of Limit Order Book  
  B5-B6 B4-B5 B3-B4 B2-B3 B1-B2 A1-B1 A2-A1 A3-A2 A4-A3 A5-A4 A6-A5
Relative spread  
 Mean 0.0407 0.0346 0.0284 0.0222 0.0214 0.0338 0.0186 0.0170 0.0167 0.0166 0.0166 
    
  
   
    
  
Median 0.0204 0.0199 0.0184 0.0178 0.0185 0.0298 0.0165 0.0147 0.0143 0.0138 0.0138
SD 0.0854 0.0699 0.0470 0.0205 0.0143 0.0184 0.0114 0.0100 0.0103 0.0116 0.0131
Absolute spread (baht) 
 Mean 0.74 0.71 0.66 0.62 0.66 1.13 0.57 0.54 0.55 0.57 0.59
Median 0.38 0.37 0.34 0.33 0.33 0.58 0.31 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.32
SD 0.89 0.88 0.82 0.77 0.89 1.49 0.65 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.68
 
Panel B Depth at Six Levels of Limit Order Book  
  B6 B5 B4 B3 B2 B1 A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
Depth (shares) 
 Mean 31,932 29,984 30,081 31,173 29,490 33,880 20,414 26,134 29,497 27,608 26,398 24,400 
  
  
Median 11,554 12,484 13,463 13,908 12,953 17,353 10,441 11,331 13,254 13,641 13,086 12,686
SD 55,488 44,110 44,007 45,710 41,042 45,619 25,347 37,706 41,786 36,882 33,406 30,026
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Table 3. Equality Test of Price Spreads and Depths  
This Table presents the equality test of price spreads and depths using the Wald linear restriction test from the following regression.  
 
iAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
BABABBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBBi
DDDDD
DDDDDDSpread
εβββββ
ββββββ
++++++
+++++=
−−−−−−−−−−
−−−−−−−−−−−−
56564545343423231212
111121213232434354546565
                
 
 iAAAAAAAAAAAABBBBBBBBBBBBj DDDDDDDDDDDDDepth εββββββββββββ ++++++++++++= 665544332211112233445566  
Spreadi and Depthj are the price spread and depth of successive levels in the order book for all stocks after stacking all observations.  Di, i = B5-
B6, ..., A6-A5 and Dj where j = B6, ..., A6 are dummy variables which equal to one if the observation of Spread or Depth belong to the book 
level i or j.  The number of i and j are 11 and 12 respectively.  Wald statistics is used to test the sets of linear restrictions.  
Panel A: Equality of Spread DF Relative spread equality test 
 Wald test P-value 
Displayed spreads including bid-ask spread: 2312112132 AAAABABBBB −−−−− ==== βββββ  4 16.88 0.0020 
Displayed spreads excluding bid-ask spread: 23122132 AAAABBBB −−−− === ββββ  3 1.69 0.6402 
Spreads on the bid side: 2132435465 BBBBBBBBBB −−−−− ==== βββββ  4 26.36 0.0000 
Spreads on the ask side: 5645342312 AAAAAAAAAA −−−−− ==== βββββ  4 0.28 0.9908 
Panel B: Equality of Depth DF Depth equality test  
 Wald test P-value 
Displayed depths including market depths: 321123 AAABBB ββββββ =====  5 9.22 0.1006 
Displayed depth excluding market depths: 3223 AABB ββββ ===  3 1.13 0.7690 
Depths on the bid side: 123456 BBBBBB ββββββ =====  5 1.13 0.9519 
Depths on the ask side: 654321 AAAAAA ββββββ =====  5 4.09 0.5366 
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Table 4. Determinants of the Shape of Order Book 
The factors determining the shape of order book are examined through the following regression.  
iiiiii VolumeVolatilityFirmSizeTickSizeConvexity εβββββ +++++= 43210   
where Convexityi is the average of the slope difference of the price schedule; TickSizei is the minimum relative price spread; FirmSizei is the 
market capitalization; Volatilityi is the trade price volatility; Volumei  is the trading volume.  All the variables are standardized by subtracting the 
cross-sectional mean and divided by the standard deviation.  Total refers to the regression when Convexityi is computed including both bid and 
ask sides.  Bid (Ask) side is the regression when Convexityi is computed including only bid (ask) side.  Positive (Negative) Convexity is the 
regression based on the firms with the positive (negative) Convexityi.  Large (Small) firms are firms with market capitalization larger (smaller) 
than the median of all firms.  Large (Small) Tick Size are firms with relative tick size larger (smaller) than the median tick size of all firms.     
The number in the parenthesis is the t-statistic adjusted by White heteroskedasticity, where * and ** denote 95% and 99% statistically 
significance.   
 Total Book All Firms 
 All Firms Large Firms Small Firms Large Tick Size Small Tick Size Bid Side Ask Side 
TickSize       0.556 -0.009 0.773 0.762 0.051 0.466 0.546
(6.56)** (-0.11) (7.50)** (6.77)** (0.48) (6.70)** (5.23)**
FirmSize
 
0.205 -0.003 0.026 0.038 0.078 0.141 0.245
(3.11)** (-0.04) (0.29) (0.71) (0.98) (2.20)* (3.59)**
Volatility
 
-0.693 -0.800 -0.427 -0.271 -0.805 -0.718 -0.491
(-7.45)** (-8.21)** (-3.09)** (-4.29)** (-7.95)** (-8.21)** (-4.38)**
Volume 0.032 -0.164 0.120 0.223 -0.1334 0.068 -0.024
(0.63) (-2.08)* (1.21) (3.12)** (1.61) (1.08) (-0.45)
Durbin-Watson 1.90 1.77 1.20 1.75 2.00 1.81 2.00
Adjusted-R2 0.45 0.52 0.48 0.50 0.57 0.45 0.29
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Table 5. Intraday Variation of the Order Book 
The intraday patterns of interested variables are estimated as follows:  , subject to  t
k
tkk
h
thh
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t dweekdtimeY εγβα ˆˆˆˆ
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1
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==
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h
h γβ
where Ykt denotes the variables of interest which consist of Complete Quote, Bid-Ask Spread, Length of Order Book, Length of Bid, Length of 
Ask, Price Spreads of the Successive Quote (B1-B2, B2-B3, A2-A1, A3-A2), Length of Limit Order Book, Length of Bid, and Length of Ask 
Market Depth, Displayed Depth, Total Depth, Depths at Display Quoted (B3, B2, B1, A1, A2, A3).  For each variable, the data of 141 stocks are 
stacked into a column and are standardized by subtracting the mean and divided by the standard deviation of its own stock.  Then, the 
standardized variables are regressed against the time of the day and the day of the week dummies.  The table reports the cross-sectional averages 
of the coefficients and the adjusted R2.  The statistical significance is based on the signed test of the estimated coefficients, where ** and * 
indicates 99% and 95% significance level.   
Panel A Time Variation of Complete Quote, Length of the book, and Spread  
 Complete Quote 
Length of 
Book 
Length of 
Bid 
Length of 
Ask 
Bid-Ask 
Spread B1-B2    B2-B3 A2-A1 A3-A2
Constant          0.9227** 13.90** 6.40** 7.50** 1.1294** 0.6563** 0.6198** 0.5722** 0.5416**
10:00-10:30          
          
         
          
          
         
          
          
          
         
          
          
          
        
0.0046** -1.93** -0.75** -1.18** 0.5248** 0.0945** 0.0504** 0.0949** 0.0579**
10:30-11:00 0.0128** -0.83** -0.20**
 
-0.62** 0.1763** 0.0409** 0.0300** 0.0390** 0.0334**
11:00-11:30 0.0129** -0.34** 0.01 -0.35** 0.0553** 0.0066** 0.0127** 0.0227** 0.0179**
11:30-12:00 0.0113** -0.05** 0.10** -0.15** -0.0140 -0.0035 0.0071** 0.0061 0.0085**
12:00-12:30 0.0105**
 
0.17** 0.11** 0.06** -0.0590** -0.0070 0.0030 -0.0063** -0.0011
14:30-15:00 -0.0017 0.48** 0.13** 0.34** -0.1294** -0.0192** -0.0202** -0.0218** -0.0146**
15:00-15:30 -0.0049** 0.65** 0.16** 0.50** -0.1565** -0.0244** -0.0195** -0.0316** -0.0231**
15:30-16:00 -0.0138** 0.83** 0.23** 0.60** -0.1885** -0.0326** -0.0242** -0.0443** -0.0333**
16:00-16:30
 
-0.0316** 1.02** 0.21** 0.81** -0.2090** -0.0554** -0.0393** -0.0586** -0.0456**
Monday 0.0046** -0.21** -0.29** 0.08** 0.1006** 0.0137 0.0231 0.0242** 0.0092**
Tuesday -0.0004 0.08** 0.03 0.05 0.0215* -0.0074 -0.0084 0.0052 0.0097
Wednesday -0.0032 0.05 0.31** -0.26** -0.0370** -0.0083 -0.0120 -0.0168** -0.0111**
Thursday
 
-0.0026 0.07**
 
0.03 0.04 -0.0327** 0.0125 0.0143 -0.0081 -0.0058
Friday 0.0016 0.01 -0.09** 0.10** -0.0524** -0.0105** -0.0170** -0.0046 -0.0020
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Panel B The Time Variation of Depth   
 Market Depth 
Displayed 
Depth Total Depth       B1 B2 B3 A1 A2 A3
Constant          51,941** 150,578** 351,730** 32,629** 26,960** 26,729** 19,881** 25,164** 26,979**
10:00-10:30          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
          
         
       
         
        
          
-13,439** -43,719** -112,639** -7,286** -8,357** -7,806** -6,062** -7,027** -7,968**
10:30-11:00 -8,728** -24,559** -61,699** -5,241** -4,713** -4,245** -3,555** -3,597** -4,444**
11:00-11:30 -6,162** -14,055** -33,942** -4,007** -2,614** -2,540** -2,289** -1,539** -2,130**
11:30-12:00 -3,931** -6,993** -15,130** -2,678** -1,460** -1,096** -1,456** -573** -859**
12:00-12:30 -2,038** -1,401** 77 -1,222** -234 -70** -996** -67** -65
14:30-15:00 2,689** 8,920** 24,611** 1,858** 2,075** 1,942** 868** 1,120** 1,804**
15:00-15:30 5,385** 16,396** 43,802** 2,932** 3,050** 3,078** 2,474** 2,187** 3,090**
15:30-16:00 8,988** 24,530** 62,656** 4,751** 4,314** 4,136** 4,244** 3,816** 4,073**
16:00-16:30
 
17,235** 40,881** 92,266** 10,892** 7,939** 6,601** 6,772** 5,681** 6,499**
Monday -10,987** -20,068** -36,417** -9,518** -2,220**
 
-3,553** -1,474**
 
-2,413** -1,868**
 Tuesday -8,632** -10,447** -14,568**
 
-8,434** -248 -388** -187 -858* -355
Wednesday
 
647 1,941** -230 -1,023 -676 -540 1,702 1,957**
 
1,023**
Thursday 19,967** 25,201** 35,395** 20,274** 1,295** 1,888 -369 705 955**
Friday -995 3,373 15,819** -1,300 1,849** 2,593** 329 609** 245
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Table 6. Frequencies of Order Sequences 
This Table shows the frequency of order sequences conditional to the degree of order aggressiveness.  Limit order has the level of aggressiveness from the least aggressive order at level 1 until 
level 5.  The market order has the aggressiveness from level 6 to the most aggressive at level 9.  MB9 (MS9) is market buy (sell) order with order price higher (lower) than the best ask (bid) 
price, and the order size larger than the shares available at the ask (bid).  MB8 (MS8) is market buy (sell) order with the order size larger than shares available at ask (bid) and the order price 
equal to the price at the ask (bid).  MB7 (MS7) is market buy (sell) order with order price higher than the ask (bid) and the volume is smaller than the prevailing ask (bid).  MB6 (MS6) is market 
buy (sell) order with order price equal to the best ask (bid) price and order volume lower than prevailing ask (bid).  LB5 (LS5) is limit buy (sell) order with order price higher than the best bid 
(offer) price.  LB4 (LS4) is limit buy (sell) order that enters when the limit order book on bid (ask) is empty.  LB3 (LS3) is limit buy (sell) orders with order price equal to the best bid (ask) 
price.  LB2 (LS2) is limit buy (sell) order with order price lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) price but higher (lower) than the third bid (ask) price.  LB1 (LS1) is limit buy (sell) order with 
order price lower (higher) than the third bid (ask) price.  Each row and column represents the order flow event at time t-1 and t respectively.  Each row is an analogous probability vector and 
adds up to 100 percent.  The maximum proportion in each row is in a bold format.   
 t 
t-1 
No. of 
obs. 
% of 
Total MB9                  
                    
MS9 MB8 MS8 MB7 MS7 MB6 MS6 LB5 LS5 LB4 LS4 LB3 LS3 LB2 LS2 LB1 LS1
MB9 20,259 0.43 5.15 0.73 4.07 12.68 3.88 0.65 11.32 4.96 5.41 10.29 0.35 0.02 5.93 7.21 5.10 11.07 2.84 8.34
MS9                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                   
                   
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                   
                   
                    
17,617 0.38 0.80 3.79 11.90 3.97 0.79 3.11 4.11 11.63 9.13 5.85 0.12 0.16 6.66 7.25 10.14 8.20 6.14 6.25
MB8 382,473 8.15 0.17 0.07 2.19 11.52 0.27 0.17 26.85 2.35 3.14 7.65 0.08 0.19 8.15 8.15 6.54 9.63 4.57 8.32
MS8 375,632 8.00 0.09 0.16 10.54 1.94 0.14 0.22 2.41 24.99 7.02 3.06 0.28 0.03 9.45 8.55 9.22 8.40 6.69 6.82
MB7 32,007 0.68 1.32 0.45 2.99 6.76 28.85 1.01 8.53 8.12 2.10 3.66 0.07 0.02 8.52 8.11 4.76 5.88 4.32 4.52
MS7 26,943 0.57 0.40 1.72 7.88 3.06 1.09 9.69 6.26 14.10 3.63 3.83 0.06 0.13 10.87 10.20 8.00 7.54 5.69 5.86
MB6 993,969 21.17 0.15 0.07 1.00 3.23 0.32 0.18 33.60 3.05 2.07 1.32 0.04 0.03 11.05 13.87 7.23 9.08 5.11 8.60
MS6 916,081 19.51 0.06 0.09 2.96 0.85 0.20 0.27 3.05 31.72 1.29 2.00 0.04 0.02 15.26 11.18 8.68 8.57 7.20 6.56
LB5 348,049 7.41 1.15 0.86 12.72 7.44 0.25 0.81 4.16 1.09 23.52 7.30 0.14 0.37 7.98 6.61 6.45 8.08 4.21 6.85
LS5 357,825 7.62 1.00 1.00 8.21 10.89 0.25 0.80 1.53 3.95 6.41 23.63 0.42 0.06 6.49 8.95 6.85 8.19 5.08 6.28
LB4 14,409 0.31 1.49 2.14 7.92 7.11 0.43 2.37 3.67 1.30 0.30 12.09 36.98 0.38 0.58 7.10 0.46 9.08 0.15 6.46
LS4 12,803 0.27 0.93 0.55 6.47 7.27 0.40 1.40 0.61 2.59 8.53 0.19 0.45 56.99 4.30 0.52 5.02 0.09 3.56 0.13
LB3 1,253,410 26.70 0.09 0.13 6.42 1.79 0.21 0.20 6.99 10.20 3.55 1.68 0.12 0.03 26.08 8.78 10.92 8.73 6.89 7.19
LS3 1,163,005 24.77 0.17 0.10 2.05 6.39 0.23 0.23 10.77 7.18 1.89 3.96 0.07 0.08 9.53 23.09 8.05 11.51 6.20 8.52
LB2 927,923 19.77 0.11 0.13 3.83 2.64 0.21 0.16 6.65 7.82 3.60 2.45 0.05 0.06 16.30 10.20 19.59 9.48 8.96 7.76
LS2 993,547 21.16 0.16 0.12 3.11 4.30 0.22 0.20 8.78 6.80 2.72 3.80 0.11 0.00 11.21 15.22 8.72 19.29 6.43 8.79
LB1 722,078 15.38 0.08 0.11 2.86 2.45 0.24 0.17 6.17 8.62 2.31 2.37 0.00 0.05 11.95 10.06 12.85 9.12 21.47 9.10 
LS1 831,710 17.71 0.15 0.10 2.95 3.56 0.24 0.18 10.33 6.10 2.81 2.87 0.09 0.03 10.92 11.78 8.56 12.17 7.74 19.43 
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Table 7. Hypotheses of Conditional Order Sequence 
This Table presents the cross-sectional average of order sequence between market buy 
order (MB), market sell order (MS), limit buy order (LB), and limit sell order (LS).  
Panel A shows the descriptive statistics of the sequence likelihood.  Panel B compares 
the probability of sequence pattern with the results of Parlour (1998) and Ranaldo 
(2003).  Panel C shows the cross-sectional average of proportion of order type 
conditional on the size of bid-ask spread.  
Panel A Symmetry of Limit Orders and Market Orders 
Probability Mean Median SD Max Min
MSt|MSt-1 0.60 0.61 0.03 0.67 0.48
MSt|MBt-1 0.43 0.42 0.04 0.53 0.34
MBt|MBt-1 0.57 0.58 0.04 0.66 0.47
MBt|MSt-1 0.40 0.39 0.03 0.52 0.33
LBt|LBt-1 0.58 0.58 0.03 0.69 0.47
LBt|MBt-1 0.22 0.22 0.03 0.34 0.12
LBt|LSt-1 0.40 0.40 0.03 0.49 0.29
LBt|MSt-1 0.28 0.27 0.03 0.38 0.17
LSt|LSt-1 0.60 0.60 0.03 0.71 0.51
LSt|MSt-1 0.29 0.29 0.04 0.47 0.21
LSt|LBt-1 0.42 0.42 0.03 0.53 0.31
LSt|MBt-1 0.30 0.30 0.03 0.39 0.21
 
Panel B Comparing with Parlour (1998) and Ranaldo (2003) 
Number of stocks following the hypotheses Parlour (1998)’s predictions Ranaldo (2003) Findings
Prob[MSt|MBt-1] < Prob[MSt|MSt-1] 8/15 141/141
Prob[MBt|MSt-1] < Prob[MBt|MBt-1] 15/15 141/141
Prob[LBt|LBt-1]  < Prob[LBt|MBt-1] 15/15 0/141
Prob[LBt|MBt-1] < Prob[LBt|LSt-1] 0/15 141/141
Prob[LBt|LSt-1] < Prob[LBt|MSt-1] 15/15 0/141
Prob[LSt|LSt-1] < Prob[LSt|MSt-1] 15/15 0/141
Prob[LSt|MSt-1] < Prob[LSt|LBt-1] 0/15 137/141
Prob[LSt|LBt-1] < Prob[LSt|MBt-1] 15/15 1/141
 
Panel C Proportion of Order Type Conditional on the Size of Bid-Ask Spread 
 Buy Market MB MS LB LS
Large spread 0.4905 0.1841 0.0976 0.0865 0.3929 0.4230
Medium-large spread  0.4839 0.2853 0.1467 0.1386 0.3372 0.3775
Medium-small spread 0.4825 0.3628 0.1881 0.1747 0.2944 0.3428
Small spread 0.4785 0.4113 0.2128 0.1985 0.2658 0.3229
 
 38
Table 8. Conditional Order Time Interval 
This table presents the cross-sectional mean of the unconditional and conditional time 
interval of order (in seconds).  The order time interval is conditioned to the spread 
size and the order aggressiveness.  There are four groups of spread size, classifying by 
the time-series first quartile, between the first quartile and second quartile, between 
median and third quartile, or above the third quartile.  The order aggressiveness have 
nine levels starting from the least aggressive order at level one to the most aggressive 
order at level 9.  MB (MS) refers to market buy (sell), and LB (LS) is the limit buy 
(sell).  The statistics in the table shows the cross-sectional mean, median, and standard 
deviation of conditional order time interval.  The equality test of conditional time 
interval is done using the ANOVA F-test and the nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test. 
The degree of freedom is shown in the parenthesis.  ** and * denote 99% and 95% 
significance level.  
 Time interval (sec) Equality Test 
 
Mean Median SD ANOVA Kruskal 
Wallis
Unconditional 332.5 243.8 282.0  
  
Large spread 378.1 264.9 328.9 7.66** 11.62**
Medium-large spread  347.4 269.3 279.9  (3,560) (3)
Medium-small spread 287.8 201.8 241.9  
Small spread 235.1 188.5 197.4  
  
MB9 (most aggressive) 62.4 44.4 60.8 26.08** 183.25**
MB8  202.4 167.3 153.7 (8,1120) (8)
MB7 142.7 69.5 226.5  
MB6 231.7 181.9 190.3  
LB5 325.2 252.4 273.8  
LB4 309.2 144.9 361.3  
LB3 404.4 315.1 336.4  
LB2 409.0 341.0 320.0  
LB1 (least aggressive) 427.5 351.1 364.6  
  
MS9 (most aggressive) 79.5 64.8 59.6 15.58** 95.76**
MS8 221.3 170.3 176.8 (8,1120) (8)
MS7 254.2 136.3 301.3  
MS6 304.1 248.4 251.9  
LS5 378.7 271.2 323.6  
LS4 276.7 123.9 372.2  
LS3 427.4 315.7 349.1  
LS2 403.9 309.4 330.8  
LS1 (least aggressive) 445.0 328.6 382.6  
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Table 9. Determinants of Order Aggressiveness 
An ordered probit model is used to examine the determinants of order aggressiveness.  , where Yt is the order aggressiveness; Yt =1, 2, 3, and 4 for limit order placed 
behind the displayed quote, within the displayed quote, at the best quote, and improve the quote respectively; Yt = 5 and 6 for the market order at the best quote and the market order with trade 
size larger than the best quote or the price better than the best quote.  The explanatory variables are the standardized variables that represent the state of order book and market sentiment.  Bid-
ask spread is the relative spread.  Same (Opposite) spread is the percentage price spread between price at the best quote and price at the third best quote on the same (opposite) side of order 
type.  Same (Opposite) market depth is the number of shares available at the best bid (ask) side for buy order, and at the best ask (bid) side for sell order.  Same (Opposite) 2nd and 3rd depth is 
the displayed shares at the second and third bid (ask) side for buy (sell) order.  Trade volatility is the standard deviation of the last 10 price changes.  Trade time elapsed is the average time 
interval between the last 10 trades.  Order volume is the number of shares in the order.  The bull (bear) market is the period when the return of last 10 trades is positive (negative).  The 
regression of the positive and negative sentiment of buyers and sellers are done separately.  The numbers shown are the cross-sectional average coefficient of all 141 stocks, stocks with tick size 
larger and smaller than the median tick size, and stocks with market capitalization larger and smaller than the median size.  ** and * denote 99% and 95% significance level from the signed test.    
t
K
h
thht XY εβ +=∑
=1
,
 Bull Market  Bear Market 
 Total Large Tick  Small Tick  Large Firm Small Firm  Total Large Tick Small Tick Large Firm Small Firm 
Panel A: Buyers            
Bid-ask spread            
            
          
        
       
            
          
           
        
         
  
            
            
          
           
        
           
            
            
     
        
           
-0.0658** -0.0836** -0.0482** -0.0251** -0.1059** -0.1045** -0.1132** -0.0960** -0.0570** -0.1513**
Same spread 0.0256** 0.0359** 0.0154** 0.0311** 0.0201**
 
0.0310**
 
0.0348** 0.0273** 0.0361** 0.0260**
Opposite spread -0.0206** -0.0121** -0.0290** -0.0391** -0.0025 0.0080 0.0134 0.0027* -0.0184** 0.0340**
Same market depth 0.3398** 0.2578** 0.4206** 0.4345** 0.2464** 0.0865** 0.1122** 0.0612** 0.0610** 0.1116**
Same 2nd-3rd depth 0.0042* 0.0105* -0.0020 -0.0041 0.0124* 0.0246** 0.0321** 0.0172** 0.0182** 0.0309**
Opposite market depth -0.1809** -0.2073** -0.1548** -0.1559** -0.2054** -0.0890** -0.1002**
 
-0.0779** -0.0633** -0.1143**
 Opposite 2nd-3rd depth
 
0.0488** 0.0344** 0.0629** 0.0627** 0.0350** 0.0150** 0.0031 0.0267** 0.0368** -0.0064
Trade volatility -0.0260** -0.0192** -0.0327** -0.0341** -0.0180** 0.0346** 0.0399 0.0295** 0.0166** 0.0524**
Trade time elapsed 
 
-0.0202** -0.0268** 
 
-0.0136** -0.0201** -0.0202** 0.0110** -0.0016 0.0233** 0.0171** 0.0049
Order volume
 
0.0279**
 
0.0101 0.0454**
 
0.0464**
 
0.0097
 
 -0.0062
  
-0.0295 0.0168
 
0.0291**
 
-0.0409**
 
Panel B: Sellers
Bid-ask spread -0.0851** -0.0894** -0.0809** -0.0586** -0.1112** -0.0334** -0.0448**
 
-0.0222** -0.0085 -0.0580**
 Same spread 0.0362** 0.0384**
 
0.0340** 0.0361** 0.0362** 0.0139** 0.0030 0.0247** 0.0309** -0.0028
Opposite spread 0.0127** 0.0085 0.0168** 0.0141** 0.0113 0.0069** 0.0210 -0.0070** -0.0100** 0.0235
Same market depth 0.1180** 0.1367** 0.0996** 0.1177** 0.1184** 0.0937** 0.0968** 0.0906** 0.0860**
 
0.1013**
Same 2nd-3rd depth 0.0137** 0.0173** 0.0101* 0.0020 0.0251** 0.0156** 0.0177** 0.0135** 0.0071 0.0239**
Opposite market depth -0.1950** -0.1517** -0.2376** -0.2598** -0.1310** -0.0640** -0.0824** -0.0458** -0.0492** -0.0785**
Opposite 2nd-3rd depth 0.0442** 0.0472** 0.0412** 0.0463** 0.0421**
 
0.0319** 0.0328** 0.0310** 0.0301** 0.0336**
 Trade volatility -0.0025** 0.0017 -0.0066** -0.0188** 0.0136 -0.0114** -0.0103** -0.0125** -0.0222** -0.0008
Trade time elapsed 
 
0.0978** 0.1059** 0.0898** 0.0921** 0.1035** 0.0647** 0.0777** 0.0518** 0.0540** 0.0753**
Order volume 0.0878** 0.0762** 0.0993** 0.1160** 0.0600** 0.1044** 0.1195** 0.0894** 0.1124** 0.0964**
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Table 10. Marginal Likelihood for Each Order Placement Choice 
This table shows the marginal likelihood for six order placement choices with respect to the change of one standard deviation in the limit order book components.  Six order 
placement choices starting from the least aggressiveness order are a limit order placed behind the displayed quote, a limit order within the displayed quote, a limit order placed at the best 
quote, a limit order that improves the quote, a market order at the best quote, and the market order with trade size larger than the best quote or the price better than the best quote.  The limit 
order book components consist of seven variables as follows.  Bid-ask spread is the relative spread.  Same (Opposite) spread is the percentage price difference between price 
at the best quote and price at the third best quote on the same (opposite) side of order type.  Same (Opposite) market depth is the number of shares available at the best bid 
(ask) side for buy order, and at the best ask (bid) side for sell order.  Same (Opposite) 2nd and 3rd depth is the shares at the second and best bid (ask) side for buy (sell) order.  
The bull (bear) market is the period when the return of last 10 trades is positive (negative).  The regression of the positive and negative sentiment of buyers and sellers are 
done separately.  ** and * denote 99% and 95% significance level from the signed test. 
 Bull Market  Bear Market 
LO.
undisp. 
LO. best 
2-3 
LO. at 
the mkt. 
LO. 
improve 
MO at 
the mkt. 
MO. 
improve 
LO.
undisp. 
LO. best 
2-3 
LO. at 
the mkt. 
LO. 
improve 
MO at 
the mkt. 
MO. 
improve 
Panel A: Buyers              
Bid-ask spread
 
              
             
   0.03**     
              
              
             
              
  
             
              
             
             
              
              
              
              
0.33** 0.48** 0.20** -0.02** -0.33** 0.65** 0.76** 0.72** 0.10 -0.17** -0.43** 0.98**
Same spread -0.21** -0.17** -0.04** 0.05** 0.19** -0.18** -0.34**
 
-0.15**
 
0.05**
 
0.09**
 
0.16**
 
-0.20**
 Opposite spread 0.19** 0.10** -0.02** -0.14** 0.16** -0.01 -0.09 -0.03* 0.00 0.02 -0.11
Same market depth -2.44** -2.11** -0.69** 0.23** 2.30** -2.71** -0.72** -0.58** 0.03 0.18** 0.42** -0.68**
Same 2nd-3rd depth -0.03* -0.04* 0.00** 0.02* 0.04* -0.02* -0.21** -0.16** 0.02**
 
0.05** 0.12** -0.19**
Opposite market depth 1.09** 1.24** 0.46** -0.11** -1.14** 1.54** 0.66** 0.57** 0.02 -0.08** -0.40** 0.78**
Opposite 2nd-3rd depth
 
-0.36**
 
-0.30** -0.09**
 
0.03**
 
0.31**
 
-0.40**
 
-0.22**
 
-0.04** 0.04
 
0.06**
 
0.09**
 
-0.07**
  
Panel B: Sellers  
Bid-ask spread
 
0.81** 0.49** -0.01 -0.18** -0.42** 0.69** 0.22** 0.22** 0.08** -0.03** -0.17** 0.32**
Same spread -0.36** -0.19** 0.01**
 
0.07** 0.19** -0.29** -0.17** -0.07** 0.01** 0.02** 0.11** -0.10**
Opposite spread -0.12** -0.06** 0.00 0.04** 0.05** -0.10** -0.01** -0.05** -0.03** 0.01** 0.00** -0.08**
Same market depth -1.15** -0.67** 0.09** 0.21** 0.68** -0.85** -0.72** -0.58** -0.16** 0.10** 0.55** -0.81**
Same 2nd-3rd depth -0.14** -0.07** 0.02** 0.03** 0.07** -0.09** -0.13** -0.10** -0.01** 0.03** 0.09** -0.13**
Opposite market depth 1.98** 1.03** -0.18** -0.31** -1.19** 1.33** 0.53** 0.42** 0.06** -0.08** -0.39** 0.53**
Opposite 2nd-3rd depth -0.45** -0.24** 0.05** 0.07** 0.27** -0.30** -0.27** -0.20** -0.02** 0.05** 0.21** -0.24**
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Figure 1. Hypothetical Example of Convex Limit Order Book 
This figure shows the convex shape of order book when the relative price spreads 
increase by 20% and the depths decrease by 20% at each successive quote away from 
the market. The vertical axis is the relative price deviation away from the mid quote 
price, while the horizontal axis is the cumulative depth at the six best bid and best ask 
quotes of the order book.  The positive (negative) relative price deviation and 
cumulative depths represents the order book on the bid (ask) side. 
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Figure 2. Hypothetical Example of Concave Limit Order Book 
This figure shows the concave shape of order book when the relative price spreads 
decrease by 20% and the depths increase by 20% at each successive quote away from 
the market. The vertical axis is the relative price deviation away from the mid quote 
price, while the horizontal axis is the cumulative depth at the six best bid and best ask 
quotes of the order book.  The positive (negative) relative price deviation and 
cumulative depths represent the order book on the bid (ask) side. 
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Figure 3. Cross-sectional Shape of Order Book on the SET 
This figure presents the relationship of average price deviation and cumulative depth 
at the six best bid and best ask quotes of the order book.  The positive (negative) price 
deviation and cumulative depths represent the order book on the bid (ask) side. 
-0.20
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
-200,000 -150,000 -100,000 -50,000 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000
Cumulative Depth (Shares)
Relative Price Deviation from Midpoint
 
 
 44
